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Abstract
We employ school and year fixed-effects regression to determine the effect of voucher
programs on the supply of private schools. In particular, we examine individual private schools
in Washington, D.C., Indiana, and Louisiana as they transition into voucher program
environments. We leverage the Private School Universe Survey to examine how schools selfidentify before and after switching into voucher environments. We find that upon switching into
school voucher programs, private schools in more heavily regulated programs are more likely to
identify as less specialized than they were prior to entering the program, and that those schools in
more lightly regulated environments continue to highlight their specialized approach to
education. These findings are examined within an institutional theory framework to understand
the potential homogenizing effect of regulations on the diversity of the private school market.
Keywords: private school; school choice; schooling supply; school vouchers;
organizational theory; institutional theory; isomorphism; homogenization
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Introduction
With the recent confirmation of Betsy DeVos as U.S. Education Secretary, and with
growing state adoption of voucher and other educational choice models, private school choice
has become an important topic. Since private school choice options are being proposed in
numerous states across the country, it is especially important to examine the impacts that
program design has on students and the private schools that participate.
All but two of the twenty experimental evaluations of private school choice programs
across the globe have found null to positive impacts on student achievement (Shakeel, Anderson,
& Wolf, 2016). One of these exceptions was an evaluation of the Louisiana Scholarship Program
(LSP) (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015), while the other is the most recent evaluation
of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) (Dynarski et al., 2017). One theory for why
the LSP produced large negative results is that the relatively high regulatory costs associated
with program involvement disincentivized high quality schools from participating at all (Sude,
DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2017). Likewise, the regulatory costs associated with program participation
may lead to homogenization of the supply of schooling. A homogenous supply of schools could
produce negative academic results through the failure to match interests of students and
educators.
As more private schools begin participating in a growing school voucher movement, the
regulatory environment in which these school choice programs operate could reify existing
norms about schooling while homogenizing a budding alternative education sector. If
homogenization of the private school market occurs, it could do so in a way that limits
innovation and, ultimately, the range of options available to families. We consider the impact of
voucher participation on private schools in three locations through the lens of institutional

3

theory, adding to our understanding of choice program design in ways largely unexplored within
education policy.
Literature Review
Impacts of Private School Choice
Scholars have conducted numerous evaluations of the impact of school choice on
academic achievement, academic attainment, resulting competitive pressure on surrounding
public schools, and the impact on parental satisfaction. Although there are other areas with
considerable research on the impact of school choice, pertaining, for example, to the effects of
competitive pressure on public schools (Egalite, 2013; Hoxby, 2001; Carnoy et al., 2007), parent
perceptions of school safety (Wolf et al., 2013), civic values (Howell & Peterson, 2006; Fleming,
Mitchell, & McNally, 2014; & Mills et al., 2016), fiscal impacts (Costrell, 2010; Scafidi, 2012),
criminal activity (DeAngelis & Wolf, 2016), and integration (Greene & Winters, 2005; Greene,
Mills, & Buck, 2010; Egalite, Mills, & Wolf, 2017), this brief review of the literature is confined
to studies employing random assignment techniques, limiting the overview to the impact of
school choice on academic achievement and attainment.
Building off of Forster’s (2016) and Shakeel, Anderson, and Wolf’s (2016) reviews of
school choice evaluations, we find 19 total studies using random assignment methods; 16 of
which analyze the impact of school choice on academic achievement, and three of which
examine academic attainment impacts.
Student Achievement
To date, researchers have conducted 16 evaluations of the impact of school choice on
participants’ academic achievement using random assignment methods in the United States. Of
those 16 evaluations, 10 found statistically significant positive gains on student achievement for
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some or all students (Rouse, 1998; Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999; Greene, 2000; Howell, Wolf,
Campbell, & Peterson, 2002 (contains three studies); Barnard et al., 2003; Cowen, 2008; Jin,
Barnard, & Rubin, 2010; Bitler et al., 2015), four found no impact (Krueger & Zhu, 2004;
Bettinger & Slonim, 2006; Wolf et al., 2013; Mills & Wolf, 2017), and two found negative
impacts on academic achievement as a result of voucher use (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, &
Walters, 2015; Dynarski et al., 2017).
Authors from the experimental LSP studies suggest that one possible explanation for
negative effects on academic achievement, unique among RCT evaluations of school choice
programs, could be due to the low quality of private schools participating in the program. Just
one-third of private schools in Louisiana chose to participate in the voucher program, and
evidence suggests those that did may have been experiencing declining enrollments – a lagging
indicator of school quality – prior to enrolling in the LSP (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters,
2015). Further, researchers have found that the lower quality private schools, as measured by
tuition and enrollment levels, were more likely to participate in the LSP (Sude, DeAngelis, &
Wolf, 2017).
Student Attainment
Three evaluations employing random assignment methods have examined the impact of
school choice on students’ academic attainment. All three found statistically significant
improvements in attainment levels for school choice participants (Wolf et. al, 2013; Chingos &
Peterson, 2013; Chingos & Peterson, 2015). Of note among the random assignment evaluations
of the impact of school choice on academic attainment is the evaluation of the Washington, D.C.
OSP. This evaluation of the impact of the D.C. OSP on student academic outcomes found that
students who used a voucher to attend a private school of choice graduated at a rate 21-
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percentage points higher than the control group of students who applied for, but were not
awarded a scholarship (Wolf et. al, 2013).
Organizational Theory as a Framework
Although the impact of school choice options such as vouchers has been studied at
length, less consideration has been given to the impact the design of these programs can have on
participating private schools’ operations and character. The body of literature undergirding
organization theory, which examines the structure and functions of organizations (Scott, 1987),
provides a useful framework for more fully understanding the impact of voucher program
participation on private schools. One subset of organization theory, known as institutional
theory, examines the processes organizations undertake in order to establish legitimacy in a
given environment, and surveys the root causes that lead organizations to reproduce the
characteristics of other organizations over time. Institutional theory holds that organizations
adopt certain structures over time, “in order to gain legitimacy” (Westwood & Clegg, 2003, pg.
279). Working under the same relative set of conditions, entities that are isomorphic will begin to
take on the characteristics of other entities (Hawley, 1968), while new entrants into the market
will “seek to overcome the liability of newness by imitating established practices within the
field” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pg. 156).
This institutional isomorphism – what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) referred to as the
“inexorable push toward homogenization” and what Dacin (1997) argued is the process of “fit” –
complicates and shades what observers may have thought they knew about the impact of school
voucher programs on the private education market.
Complicating the Narrative: Institutional Isomorphism
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When considered in the context of K-12 education, institutional theory suggests that
schools may simply copy other schools to conform to existing rules to generate social legitimacy
(Oplatka, 2004). The literature of institutional theory suggests that it is possible, even within a
private school choice market, that schools’ structure will be constrained by the unwritten rules of
what society considers schooling to be (Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1992), and that schools will
incorporate “rationalized myths,” adopting the vocabularies and organizational language of
schools that preceded them (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). It is also the case that schools could simply
copy the existing beliefs of the environment in which they operate – the state, city, charter
management organization, or private school network – out of fear that not doing so will create
the perception that they are failing schools (Oplatka, 2004). At the same time, isomorphism
results from more than just the influence of organizations on other organizations (Dacin, 1997).
Parents, for example, have been identified as “inherently conservative consumers” and their need
for consumer information about schools leads to “standardized criteria for evaluation”
(Lubienski, 2003, pg. 420). These pressures compete with notion that through school choice,
practices will differ across schools.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of isomorphic pressures: 1) coercive
isomorphism, which includes formal and informal pressures to conform to existing systems, 2)
mimetic isomorphism, which includes intentionally copying existing institutions in order to gain
legitimacy, and 3) normative isomorphism, which includes unintentionally adopting the practices
and values of other institutions and organizations. Although private schools, like any other
education option, are susceptible to mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures, the types of
regulations that govern private school voucher programs can determine whether coercive
isomorphism occurs, limiting the diversity of private school type within a school choice
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program. As Astley and Van de Ven (1983) opined, “The player remains free, but if he wants to
win he must adopt a strategy in reasonable conformance with the rules, since a complete
abandonment of the game cannot serve his interests” (pg. 252). If homogenization does occur, it
will limit one of the central tenants of school choice – the idea that practices will differ across
schools, and as such, that schools will respond to parent and community preferences in a way
that meets family needs and local demands (Berends et al., 2010).
Theory
Many voucher program proponents theorize that the additional financial incentives
provided will entice market entry and specialized institutions. While this may appear intuitive in
a setting where financial incentives are created spontaneously through dispersed customer-driven
demand, the relationship is not so clear when the funding is provided from a centralized body.
Since centralized direction is, by definition, comprehensively uniform, we should not expect that
schooling providers will be more specialized. Moreover, since schooling regulation intends to
limit the types of choices available to families, we should expect less heterogeneity in the supply
of private schools.
Whenever an individual or institution receives funding from a provider, the provider is
able to exercise some form of control over the receiving establishment. After all, the provider
sends money to specific institutions if, and only if, they perceive to experience benefits from the
transaction that exceed the costs. Oftentimes, the realized benefit is in the form of donor
autonomy over the receiving organization. In order to ensure that the investment will be
worthwhile, providers have the incentive to attach conditions to the transaction.
In the case of voucher programs, the provider of public funding is the taxpayers and the
potential receiving institutions are private schools. Not surprisingly, in order to receive public
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funding for schooling operation, private schools must adhere to certain regulations determined
through democratic institutions. Scholars theorize that if individuals choose goods and services
based on rational self-interest, their choices may inadvertently harm society as a whole (Pigou,
1920). In other words, voluntary transactions between producers and consumers could affect
involuntary third parties. Since positive and negative externalities may result from an
unrestricted market, some economists argue that government regulation is necessary to protect
society overall (Bator, 1958). For example, economists argue that a tax ought to be placed on
companies that produce pollution, which harms the environment and the health of citizens that
did not voluntarily enter the transaction. However, even the founder of the Pigovian tax, Arthur
Pigou, cautioned that attempts to remedy market failures could result in even larger government
failures (Pigou, 1920; Tullock, Brady, & Seldon, 2002).
Some of the voucher program regulations, such as financial reporting and auditing, may
not impose large costs on participating private schools. Others, however, may inadvertently
change the overall mission, strategy, and composition of private schools. Costly conditions tied
to funding include standardized testing requirements, open-admissions processes, teacher
certification requirements, and the prohibition of parental copayment.
Private schools have a strong financial incentive to participate in voucher programs,
especially since they are directly competing with a product that is free at the point of delivery:
traditional public schools and public charter schools. Out of rational self-interest, schools choose
to participate in programs; however, these choices may lead to private schools that look very
much like traditional public schools if program regulations are decided by the same process that
determines the operation of residentially assigned public schools. In that case, the conditions will
reflect the traditional setting.
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The more costly and extensive the regulatory environment, the more likely it is that
private institutions will behave like public schools. As a result, we expect that more highly
regulated voucher program environments will increase homogenization of the supply of schools,
with those that face the largest regulatory environments being the most likely to become
isomorphic to their public school counterparts.
The Programs
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program
In 2011, Indiana launched its Choice Scholarship Program (CSP), which provides
vouchers to eligible children to attend a private school of choice. More than 34,600 students
currently participate in the CSP, which is open to children from families earning up to 150 of the
federal poverty line ($67,433 for a family of four during the 2016-17 academic year) or up to 200
percent of poverty for children with special needs (EdChoice, 2017). The regulations governing
the CSP are considerable: the state is permitted to review private school curricula, instruction,
classroom materials, and private schools must administer the state test. State testing outcomes
and graduation rates of participating private schools are also used to assign an A-F letter grade,
and schools receiving a D or F grade for two consecutive years lose program participation
eligibility (EdChoice, 2017). Schools must also have sound accounting practices in place.
Although these regulations are substantial, many private schools already adhered to some of
them as a condition of participation in the Indiana High School Athletics Association (Cavazos,
2016).
D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program
In 2004, Congress established the first federal K-12 school choice program, in the form
of the D.C. OSP. More than 1,100 eligible children currently use an OSP voucher to attend a
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private school of choice in the District. To be eligible, children must come from families earning
less than $44,955 annually for a family of four (EdChoice, 2017). The D.C. OSP is relatively
lightly regulated. Private school students using a voucher must take a nationally norm-referenced
test, but the private school they attend is not required to administer the exam. Private schools
must also allow site visits by the program administrator, and must have sound accounting
systems in place.
Louisiana Scholarship Program
The Louisiana Scholarship Program was established as a statewide voucher program in
2012. It had previously be confined to New Orleans, operating within Orleans Parish since 2008.
Some 7,100 students currently participate in the LSP, which is open to children from families
earning less than $60,750 annually, and who have also attended an underperforming school
(rated C, D, F, or T) during the previous school year, are entering kindergarteners, or were
enrolled in a public school in the Recovery School District (RSD).
The LSP is highly regulated. Participating private schools must use open enrollment,
students on a scholarship must take the uniform state test, and schools must maintain a
curriculum deemed on par with public schools (EdChoice, 2017). Participating private schools
must employ a testing coordinator who must attend Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education (BESE) testing workshops and any additional training required to administer the tests
(Bulletin 133, 2014). The Louisiana Department of Education also monitors overall testing
implementation and conducts school visits during testing periods (Bulletin 133, 2014). Schools
with more than 10 scholarship students in each grade or more than 40 students overall are
assigned a Scholarship Cohort Index (SCI) score. Schools that receive an SCI below 50 in year
two an onward, or have less than a 25 percent proficiency rate on state assessments, are barred
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from enrolling new scholarship students during the subsequent year (Annual Report, 2013-2014).
For private schools that do provide special education services, they must provide information
about what services will be offered, and must contrast that with the special education services the
local school system provides. They must publish their tuition and fees, and must cap tuition at
the amount charged to students without scholarships.
The major differences across program regulatory environments can be found in Table 1
below. As illustrated, the LSP has the most requirements for participating schools, and the
Center for Education Reform (2014) gave the LSP the lowest grade for regulatory freedom.
Table 1: Regulatory Burdens for Each Program
Variable

Indiana

DC

Louisiana

Date Enacted

2011

2004

2008

Average Funding Relative to Public School

42%

47%

54%

Eligibility Rate

59%

35%

20%

Private School Participation Rate

70%

78%

33%

X

X

X

Testing Requirement
Open-Admissions Process

X

Financial Reporting

X

X

Parental Copay Prohibited

X
X

Teacher Requirements
Center for Education Reform Regulatory Score1

A

X
B

C

Data
We use data from the nationally representative Private School Universe Survey from the
school year 1999-00 to 2011-12. The target population for this survey is all private schools in the
United States as defined by National Center for Education Statistics. Since the database contains
unique school IDs for each period, we are able to follow individual schools over time. Since the

1

https://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/VoucherRankings-Report5.pdf
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survey is completed every other school year, we use seven periods of data. For the LSP and the
OSP, we use three periods before the voucher program enactment and two periods of data
afterwards. For the IN CSP, however, we could only use one period of data after the intervention
since the program was enacted and launched in 2011.
We are interested in five outcome variables located in the Private School Universe
Survey questionnaire2 related to potential homogenization of individual schools. This
information is located in questions 7b, 8a, 12, and 14a. These questions ask whether the school is
coeducational (Co-Ed), whether the school has a religious orientation or purpose, and the overall
purpose or type of school. The different types of schools that we are interested include: regular,
specialized (such as science/math, performing arts, gifted and talented, foreign language
immersion), and alternative / non-traditional education. We are also interested in the percent of
white students within a school to assess how program participation impacts study body
composition.
Table 2: Timeline of Data Used
Program
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
CSP (Indiana)
Y
Y
OSP (D.C.)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
LSP (Louisiana)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Note: “Y” indicates that a period is used. Thick black vertical lines indicate the period of
voucher program enactment.
Methods
We use a school and year fixed effects regression approach of the form:
Outcomeit = β0 + β1Voucherit + αi + εit
Where Outcome is one of the six dependent variables of interest for school i at time period t. Our
six dependent variables of interest are the percent of white students and whether or not the

2

https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/pdf/Questionnaire_20112012.pdf
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school, i, identified itself as Co-Ed, Religious, Regular Ed, Specialized, or an Alternative / NonTraditional school in period t.
Voucher is the independent variable of interest, whether or not the institution was located
in an educational market that had a voucher program in place, for school i in period t. We expect
that the coefficient of interest, β1, will indicate more homogenization in the most-regulated
program: the LSP. Since the other two programs have fewer regulations overall, we expect that
the relationship will be less significant for the DC OSP and the IN CSP. Since these programs
are targeted to low-income families, we expect that β1 will indicate more racial diversity within
schools.
Since many observable characteristics of schools can be argued as relatively constant
over time, we present results for the year and school-level fixed-effects models without timevariant controls. In fact, including any controls at all would bias our estimates towards zero since
we simply wish to observe the impact of the market environment on school-level characteristics.
In other words, any characteristic of a school is an outcome of the school’s competitive
environment. Most importantly, our methods allow us to compare individual schools to
themselves, over time, as they switch into voucher settings. As a robustness check, we use a
random effects probit regression model as well. Since individual schools choose to identify as
one of several different types of institutions, we also use a multinomial probit regression model
as a robustness check. Since our sample sizes are all too small to rely on maximum likelihood
estimation, our base school and year fixed effects regression model is preferred.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Program
Variable
CSP (Indiana)
Year
Enrollment
White (Percent)
Co-Ed
Religious
Regular Ed
Voucher Period
Specialized
Alternative / Other
OSP (D.C.)
Year
Enrollment
White (Percent)
Co-Ed
Religious
Regular Ed
Voucher Period
Specialized
Alternative / Other
LSP (Louisiana)
Year
Enrollment
White (Percent)
Co-Ed
Religious
Regular Ed
Voucher Period
Specialized
Alternative / Other

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1381
1381
1381
1381
1381
1381
1381
1381
1381

2011
156
83.86
0.99
0.12
0.84
0.49
0.01
0.02

1
184.74
23.62
0.08
0.32
0.36
0.50
0.10
0.14

2010
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2012
1452
100
1
1
1
1
1
1

430
430
430
430
430
430
430
430
430

2004
202
31.36
0.93
0.50
0.64
0.39
0.07
0.03

2.21
224.84
36.03
0.26
0.50
0.48
0.49
0.25
0.17

2000
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2008
1097
100
1
1
1
1
1
1

1893
1893
1893
1893
1893
1893
1893
1893
1893

2008
341
72
0.94
0.13
0.88
0.58
0.02
0.02

2.85
277.73
31.66
0.25
0.34
0.32
0.49
0.12
0.14

2004
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2012
1745
100
1
1
1
1
1
1

Results
Private schools in Indiana did not change their overall school missions as a result of
switching into a voucher program environment; however, individual private schools became
slightly more-inclusive of minority students. Specifically, Indiana private schools were about a
percentage point more inclusive of minority students after switching into a voucher environment.
These results are as expected: the voucher program in Indiana has a moderate level of regulations
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for private schools, many of which, as mentioned before, were already adhered to by private
schools for inclusion into the athletics association, and low-income students are those that are the
least well served in their residentially-assigned schools.
CSP
Table 4: The Effect of the IN CSP on Homogenization

Voucher

School/Year
Fixed Effects

Co-Ed

Religious

Regular

Specialized

Alternative

White

0.000
(1.000)

-0.003
(0.318)

0.006
(0.206)

-0.005
(0.083)

-0.006
(0.206)

-1.125*
(0.012)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2 Within
0.0000
0.0016
0.0026
0.0048
0.0026
0.0100
Time Periods
2
2
2
2
2
2
Schools
755
755
755
755
755
755
N
1381
1381
1381
1381
1381
1381
Note: All models use school and year fixed effects regression from 2010 to 2012. P-values in
parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Private schools in D.C. have around a ten-percentage point lower likelihood of describing
themselves as providing an alternative or non-traditional education after switching into the
voucher environment. This is over half of a standard deviation decrease in the alternative
classification in D.C. Importantly, the D.C. voucher program does not allow participating
schools to have control their admissions processes. Schools that provide non-traditional or
alternative educational services face substantial costs associated with accepting a diverse set of
students, so they have an incentive to adapt their model to fit all types of students. It also appears
that private schools switching in the D.C. voucher environment have around an eight-percentage
point higher likelihood of describing themselves as a “regular” school; however, this result is
only marginally significant at a p-value of 0.076. The voucher program does not appear to affect
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the racial composition of private schools in D.C., perhaps because of a lack of student race
variation in this particular sample.
OSP
Table 5: The Effect of the DC OSP on Homogenization

Voucher

School/Year
Fixed Effects

Co-Ed

Religious

Regular

Specialized

Alternative

White

0.000
(1.000)

0.002
(0.879)

0.083
(0.076)

0.023
(0.530)

-0.098**
(0.002)

0.656
(0.751)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2 Within
0.0000
0.0188
0.0161
0.0131
0.0492
0.0173
Time Periods
5
5
5
5
5
5
Schools
148
148
148
148
148
148
N
430
430
430
430
430
430
Note: All models use school and year fixed effects regression from 2000 to 2008. P-values in
parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The most interesting results emerge for the program that attaches the most regulations to
voucher funding. As expected, the LSP appears to create homogenization within the private
schooling sector for most of the measured outcomes. As a result of switching into the LSP
environment, private schools in Louisiana have a 3.6-percentage point higher likelihood of
describing themselves as regular, a 2.2-percentage point lower likelihood of describing
themselves as specialized, and a 1.5-percentage point lower likelihood of describing themselves
as non-traditional or alternative. These results range from around a tenth to a fifth of a standard
deviation. In addition, the coefficients on Co-Ed and Religious are in their expected directions,
indicating less specialization; however, these are not statistically significant, as their p-values are
around 0.15 and 0.16, respectively. Private schools in Louisiana experienced a 5.6-percentage
point increase in minority students through switching into the voucher environment. This follows
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intuition, as the LSP is targeted to the least-advantaged students based on income and school
quality.
LSP
Table 6: The Effect of the LSP on Homogenization

Voucher

School/Year
Fixed Effects

Co-Ed

Religious

Regular

Specialized

Alternative

White

0.005
(0.149)

-0.020
(0.160)

0.036**
(0.001)

-0.022*
(0.012)

-0.015*
(0.049)

-5.642***
(0.000)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2 Within
0.0029
0.1553
0.0099
0.0071
0.0036
0.0447
Time Periods
5
5
5
5
5
5
Schools
532
532
532
532
532
532
N
1893
1893
1893
1893
1893
1893
Note: All models use school and year fixed effects regression from 2004 to 2012. P-values in
parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results for regular and alternative are also
robust to the random effects probit regression model and the multinomial probit regression
model.

Conclusion and Policy Implications
Our results support our hypothesis that highly regulated voucher program environments
induce homogenization in the supply of schools. We argue that the results are causal estimates of
the impact of regulations on the homogenization of schools for a few reasons: (1) our
econometric methodology allows us to control for all time-invariant characteristics of private
schools, (2) our analysis compares three different regulatory environments, finding the strongest
homogenizing effects for the LSP, fewer effects for the OSP, and no effects for the CSP, and (3)
no other observable differences in the voucher programs would intuitively lead to different levels
of specialization.
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Intuitively, homogenization in the supply of schools could at least partially have led to
the negative experimental achievement results for the LSP. If student needs, learning abilities,
desires, and interests are unique, specialized services should lead to improved outcomes. On the
other hand, homogenization could lead to negative impacts for students, even if children are
switching into an identical environment, since students must adapt to costs associated with
moving schools.
Since private school choice programs are being proposed in several locations across the
United States, decision-makers ought to pay close attention to policy design. While additional
regulations often appear beneficial, especially since they give policy-makers the illusion of
control, costs of program participation can lead to unintended consequences for children. Our
estimates indicate that additional regulations could reduce specialization in the supply of
schooling, and, as a result, fewer choices for families. If the diverse backgrounds, interests, and
abilities of children are not matched with the available institutions, educational choice programs
could fail to lead to improved outcomes. Consequently, decision-makers must balance the costs
of regulation, such as homogenization in the supply of schools, with the benefits of regulation,
such as perceived control, in order to design the educational choice policies that work best for
families and society overall.
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